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III. HOW SEPARATION OF POWERS PROTECTS
INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES
A. L. GORDON CROVITZ, MODERATOR*
The first thing that strikes me about the separation of powers
is that so few people discuss the subject at all. Why, it is almost
like treating the tenth amendment as if it is still part of our Con-
stitution. Of course, federalism and separation of powers were the
twin towers holding the liberties of the individual above the pow-
ers of the state. Many of the Founders, indeed, thought the Bill of
Rights was unnecessary: The federal government, limited by the
overweening powers of the states and by its own system of
sharply divided powers, could never pose a threat to the liberty of
the individual. We know how long that view lasted.
One question we might discuss is whether we still have a sys-
tem of separation of powers or whether we have another kind of
government altogether, one that might be called a bastardized
parliamentary system, where the legislative power belongs to the
legislative branch and the executive power belongs to the legisla-
tive branch. Founding wisdom on this point comes from Federal-
ist Number 70, where Hamilton warned of the grave dangers to
liberty if ever the executive branch of government lost its way:
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition
of good government. It is essential to the protection of the com-
munity against foreign attacks: It is not less essential to the
steady administration of the laws, to the protection of property
against those irregular and high handed combinations, which
sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice, to the secur-
ity of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
faction and of anarchy.l
I hope our panelists will address whether the executive branch
today is energetically protecting individual liberties by protecting
its own prerogatives against the other branches. Perhaps we could
start with three small, but politically crucial, classes of individu-
als: executive branch officials, congressmen and congressional
staff.
* Assistant Editor, The Wall Street Journal Editorial Page.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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Start with the institution of special prosecutors, or, as they are
now called, independent counsel. The 1978 Ethics in Government
Act2 created a triple whammy for executive branch officials who
crossed powerful congressmen. First, the law requires the ap-
pointment of independent counsel once allegations are
made-allegations often made by congressmen and their
staffs-that cannot be disproven within ninety days3 by an attor-
ney general explicitly denied the power of subpoena or other in-
formation-gathering techniques!
Second, once independent counsel is appointed, as we have
seen, no matter how weak the evidence, there goes the political
life of that official. After investigations by an independent coun-
sel and an indictment in Bronx, New York, Raymond Donovan
had to resign as Secretary of Labor before being found not guilty
several years later by a jury that actually applauded him when it
delivered the verdict. Oliver North, despite what many see as a
patent lack of mens rea, or intent to commit a crime, still faces an
aggressive prosecution. Theodore Olson, then assistant attorney
general for the Office of Legal Counsel, was falsely accused by
liberal Democrats in the House of Representatives of having mis-
led a committee on a claim, of all things, of executive privilege,
and had to face a nearly three-year investigation by an indepen-
dent counsel, running up a personal legal bill of some one and
one-half million dollars.
Third, Congress made it two branches against one by giving a
panel of federal judges the power to appoint the independent
counsel, establish the jurisdiction of the investigation, and then
hear the case itself.ll The Supreme Court, of course, has upheld
this procedure in the case of Morrison v. Olson.6
Independent counsel does not, of course, apply to members of
Congress. House Speaker Jim Wright, for example, may get inves-
tigated by his fellows, but somehow he escapes serious scrutiny.
Interestingly, congressional staffs do not live a similarly protected
life. Congressmen manage to exempt themselves from a vast array
of laws that apply to every other employer in the nation. This list
2. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-598 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
3. [d. at § 592(b)(I).
4. [d. at § 592(a)(2).
5. [d. at § 593(b).
6. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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includes the Civil Rights Act,7 Equal Employment Opportunity
Act,8 Equal Pay Act,9 Fair Labor Standards Act,I° National Labor
Relations Act,11 Occupational Safety and Health Act,12 Freedom
of Information Actl3 and Privacy Act. 14 Recently, there was a
huge controversy in Washington when the House voted to bring
itself under a few of the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
So people who work for congressmen are denied what seem to be
minimal civil rights, even as Congress exempts itself from some of
the most burdensome regulations-OSHA comes to mind-that
can often approach a taking of private property in their effect on
private business.
In another of The Federalist papers, James Madison assumed
that congressmen would be discouraged from ever passing such
overly intrusive legislation because "they can make no law which
will not have its full operation on themselves and their friends, as
well as on the great mass of society. This has always been deemed
one of the strongest bonds by which human policy can connect
the rulers and the people together."lll
Then there is the whole question of independent agencies.
Where is the political accountability that the Founders thought
would keep government reasonably honest? My favorite anecdote
here concerns the Securities and Exchange Commission. Some of
us have wondered about its prosecutions under securities laws
that, for example, do not define insider trading; and yet, people
go to jail for insider trading and many people have their liveli-
hoods ruined.
A few years ago, I asked the then assistant attorney general for
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
8. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codi-
fied at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-14 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
9. Equal Pay Act .of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206
(1982)).
10. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201·219 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
11. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-165 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
12. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590
(codifed as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
13. Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (1974) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
14. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93·579, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552a (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 57, at 386 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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the Criminal Division in the Justice Department, now Judge Ste-
phen Trott of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, if he knew who
in the Justice Department kept an eye on the activities, including
prosecutions, of the Securities and Exchange Commission? After
all, the executive branch is the branch charged with enforcing the
laws. His answer was a long pause. Then he said he thought there
might be a congressional committee that oversaw the SEC. Rep-
resentative John Dingell, of course, would have been proud to
have heard this reply, but it seems to me that there was a reason
that the Founders gave the executive branch the power to see
that the laws are faithfully executed.
These are rather familiar questions of individual rights and
separation of powers. I would like to throw out one other that
may seem, at first, somewhat out of place: the freedom of individ-
uals to enjoy the fruits of their labors without the federal govern-
. ment taxing it away. Here I refer to the breakdown in separation
of powers when it comes to the federal budget.
Ever since the 1974 Budget and Impoundment Control Act,16
which purported to take away the President's power to impound
or refuse to spend appropriated funds, we have lost control of the
budget process. In 1986 and 1987, there were continuing resolu-
tions, massive all-in-one, veto-proof appropriations. These seem
to clearly undermine the Presentment Clause, and in the process
of subverting separation of powers, rob voters of their right to
pursue the happiness of limited federal expenditures.
This is not a cause for Congress-bashing alone. It takes two
branches acting in unholy collaboration for one to usurp the pow-
ers of the other. Has the executive branch done all it could to
protect its powers? Despite Morrison u. Olson,17 the independent
counsel case, is there any hope for the executive branch seeking
relief from the courts? If not, what political steps can a president
take to regain his rightful powers? Finally, how do we judge the
Reagan administration, which came to office pledging to stem this
trend of encroachment, yet in many ways leaves the office of the
presidency even weaker than it found it in 1981?
Here to discuss these questions or perhaps ones that they pre-
16. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
17. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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fer to discuss, are four experts in the field.
B. CHARLES J. COOPER*
I would like to look at separation of powers from the executive
branch's standpoint. I would like to begin by stating what is, by
now, a controversial proposition; to wit, that the executive power
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
Constitutionalists will recognize this statement to be the text of
section one of Article Two of the Constitution. It seems straight-
forward. It seems rather clear. In vain does the activist search its
words for a "majestic generality." But the activist, with character-
istic savoir {aire, transcends this problem. Indeed, anyone who
concludes from this language that the executive power is vested in
a President of the United States of America would be guilty of
failing to give the Constitution what one justice has said is "the
scope and elasticity afforded by what seem to be reasonable, prac-
tical implications instead of the rigidity dictated by doctrinaire
textualism."l Justice White would contribute this insight: "[O]ur
Federal Government was intentionally chartered with the flexibil-
ity to respond to contemporary needs without losing sight of fun-
damental principles."2
With statements like these have academics, courts and others
supported institutional encroachments on the executive's consti-
tutional authority. But for those of us who are gripped in the ri-
gidity of a "doctrinaire textualism," it is impossible to escape the
conclusion that under our Constitution, the President, and only
the President, holds the executive power, and all the executive
power, of the federal government.
While the clarity of the language of Article Two makes resort to
the legislative record unnecessary, that source of evidence of orig-
inal intent also makes clear that the Framers deliberately estab-
lished a unitary executive. That is, the Framers deliberately
placed all of the executive power in a single pair of hands. In fact,
• McGuire, Woods, Battle & Boothe, Washington, D.C.; Assistant Attorney General, Of·
fice of Legal Counsel, United States Department of Justice, 1985-1988.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640 (1951) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
2. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 978 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
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the Framers considered and rejected the British model of privy
counsel and other forms of government that would have diffused
the executive power. There were two main reasons that the Foun-
ders preferred a unitary executive, and they were mutually rein-
forcing. On the one hand, unity promotes dispatch and decisive-
ness which are much more necessary in the executive branch than
either of the other two branches. Hamilton in Federalist Number
70 put it quite well. I should note parenthetically that Hamilton
is a favorite of separation of powers buffs and is certainly a favor-
ite of the Office of Legal Counsel.
That unity [of the executive] is conducive to energy will not
be disputed. Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will gener-
ally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number;
and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will
be diminished.8
But even more important than dispatch was accountability,
which is the flip side of decisiveness. The more the executive
power is watered down or diffused, the easier it is for individuals
in power to escape the blame for bad actions taken or for good
actions not taken. Hamilton said this: "[O]ne of the weightiest
objections to a plurality in the executive . . . is that it tends to
conceal faults, and destroy responsibility."· But my favorite pas-
sage from Federalist Number 70 is Hamilton's concluding re-
mark: "I will only add, that ... I rarely met with an intelligent
man . . . who did not admit as the result of experience, that the
unity of the Executive ... was one of the best of the distinguish-
ing features of our constitution."1i Well, that experience has been
equally rare for me.
Understanding that the executive power is unitary, however,
brings us to the question: What is the executive power? Though
this may sound trite, the executive power of the federal govern-
ment is, in fact, everything other than the legislative or judicial
power. The legislative power, of course, is the power to make
laws. The judicial power is the power to decide cases or controver-
sies. And each branch has those powers necessary and incident to
the execution of its respective functions.
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 472 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
4. [d. at 476.
5. [d. at 480 (emphasis added).
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In accord with this distinction, the Constitution specifically
recognizes a number of powers, executive in nature, held by the
President. He is the Commander in Chief. He can grant reprieves
and pardons. He appoints his principal subordinates, and from
this power, as well as from the nature of the executive power, we
can infer that he also has the authority to remove those subordi-
nates. He is entitled to recommend to the Congress such mea-
sures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, to receive ambas-
sadors, and to veto proposed legislation. In the area of foreign
affairs he has extraordinary authorities, such as negotiating
treaties.
While some of his powers, such as the pardon power and the
veto power, could at least theoretically be exercised by the Presi-
dent without the assistance of subordinates, the vast bulk of the
executive's authorities must be carried out through delegates. In-
deed, the entire federal administrative state is established to as-
sist the President in executing his duty faithfully to execute the
law. I would submit that because the President must rely on a
host of subordinate officers to discharge his constitutional respon-
sibilities, his most important powers are the powers of appoint-
ment and removal. For without these powers, the President could,
and undoubtedly would, and perhaps may soon be reduced to a
mere spectator in his own branch. Justice Scalia put it well in
Synar v. United States,S the lower court opinion in Bowsher v.
Synar:' "[I]t is only the authority that can remove him ... that
[the officer] must fear and, in the performance of his functions,
obey."s
The fundamental need for the President to have control over
the executive branch was recognized by the first Congress in the
so-called Decision of 1789, wherein Congress concluded that the
President does indeed have, implicit in the Constitution, the
power to remove his subordinates, at least his immediate and
principal subordinates. James Madison put it succinctly:
Vest this power [of removal] in the Senate jointly with the Pres-
ident, and you abolish at once that great principle of unity and
responsibility in the Executive department.... If the Presi-
dent should possess alone the power of removal from office,
6. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C.), aff'd sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
7. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
8. Synar, 626 F. Supp. at 1401.
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those who are employed in the execution of the law will be in
their proper situation, and the chain of dependence be
preserved.9
But, just as the Framers predicted, the Congress has demon-
strated an insatiable appetite for exercising the powers the Con-
stitution delegates to the President. The basic theory of this con-
gressional imperialism is that Congress can fully work its will only
if it has authority not only to legislate, but also to supervise the
implementation of its statutes. One need only review any recent
lengthy enactment to find a host of examples of congressional en-
croachments on virtually every presidential authority. There are a
couple of enactments that are my favorites in this regard-the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 1988 and 198910 and the
Continuing Resolution of last year.ll
The Foreign Relations Act contains provisions, for example, re-
quiring the President to close diplomatic posts in certain coun-
tries and not to close diplomatic posts in certain countries.12
These are not spending power limitations. They are mandates
upon the President. But it is the President who makes the deci-
sion, under our Constitution, whether we will have relations with
certain foreign countries.
The Act also mandates that the President enter into negotia-
tions on certain subjects with certain foreign countries. IS But if
anything is clear in the Constitution, it is that the President is
responsible for negotiating treaties. To be sure, a treaty cannot
become law without the cooperation of the Senate, but the Presi-
dent decides what he will submit to the Senate and what he will
negotiate with foreign countries. Yet, this particular act would
presume to instruct him on these· subjects.
The Act also mandates that the President propose certain types
of legislation to the Congress.H The Congress is telling the Presi-
dent the subjects on which he should propose legislation back to
the Congress! Clearly, this conflicts with the provision in Article
9. 1 ANNALS OF CONGo 499 (J. Gales ed. 1834).
10. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-
24, 1987 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS (101 Stat.) 1331 [hereinafter Foreign Relations
A~. '
11. Act of Dec. 22, 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-202, 1987 U.S. CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS
(101 Stat.) 1329 [hereinafter Continuing Resolution).
12. Foreign Relations Act, supra note 10, §§ 121-122 at 1339-40.
13. Id., § 803 at 1397, § 1251 at 1427.
14. Id., § 1103 at 1408, § 805 at 1397.
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Two charging the President with authority to recommend to Con-
gress consideration of such measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient.
The Continuing Resolution of last year is even better. My fa-'
vorite provision is the surprise that Senator Kennedy had for Ru-
pert Murdock. He accomplished that by inserting a rider barring
extension of the FCC's waiver provisions on cross ownership. III
Mr. Murdock was the only person in the country who had a
waiver from the FCC, so he ended up having to sell The New
York Post. The moral of that story is do not ever call a United
States Senator "fat boy," even one who fancies himself a cham-
pion of first amendment values. Incidentally, that provision was
struck down on first amendment grounds by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. I8 The Murdock provision is
also an example of congressional micromanagement of the
executive.
You may also have heard of Senator Shelby's twenty million
dollar gift to one of his constituents. The United States had won
a personal judgment against an Alabama resident for some unlaw-
ful activity this person evidently engaged in, and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. A rider to
the Continuing Resolution, however, forbids the Justice Depart-
ment from expending any money to enforce that judgment. This
provision raises serious questions regarding the executive's au-
thority to execute the law.
A similar measure forbids the Department of Justice from argu-
ing or taking certain positions on legal questions relating to resale
price maintenance. I7 In other words, the Congress is presuming to
tell the President what he may and may not argue in the courts of
law, which is plainly unconstitutional.
There are many more examples. The Continuing Resolution
forbids the Office of Management and Budget from reviewing cer-
tain types of regulations. Indeed, one provision says that a pam-
phlet on AIDS to be prepared by the Centers for Disease Control
shall be distributed publicly without anybody reviewing it, in-
cluding the President. I8 The President cannot, under this provi-
sion, review the work of his subordinates before it becomes the
15. Continuing Resolution, supra note 11, at 1329-32.
16. News Am. Publishing, Inc. v. FCC, 844 F.2d 800 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
17. Continuing Resolution, supra note 11, at 1329-36.
18. [d., at 1329-65.
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final work of the executive branch.
Finally, although the Supreme Court outlawed legislative veto
devices in INS v. Chadha,19 there were no fewer than fourteen
legislative vetoes in the Continuing Resolution. And some of these
were not for combined Senate and House action or even one
House action, but for one committee action to veto the regula-
tions of the President.
I could go on, but I will close with a few points on Morrison v.
Olson.20 The Court's recent decision is a breathtaking example of
the Court essentially making up the rules as it goes along.
The first point deals with so-called interbranch appointments
under the Appointments Clause, which authorizes Congress to
vest appointment of inferior officers in the President alone, in the
courts of law or in the heads of departments. That language ad-
mits of two alternative constructions: one, that the Framers in-
tended to authorize Congress to provide for interbranch appoint-
ments and, therefore, presumably to provide for, say, the District
Court for the District of Columbia appointing all of the Attorney
General's subordinates or all of the subordinates to the Secretary
of State. Conversely, this construction would also permit Con-
gress to authorize the Attorney General or the Secretary of State
to appoint all officers of the judicial branch, other than Article
Three judges-administrative clerks, marshals and what have
you. The alternative construction of the Appointments Clause is
that Congress intended to authorize the heads of departments
and the courts to appoint their own subordinates without pro-
ceeding through the cumbersome and time-consuming process of
Senate confirmation.
While both of these constructions are equally borne out by the
language of the Appointments Clause, it seems likely that Con-
gress simply intended that intrabranch appointments could be
made without Senate confirmation. But whichever construction
you choose, you cannot choose both constructions-unless you are
the Supreme Court. In Morrison, the Court concluded that Con-
gress is empowered to authorize interbranch appointments, such
as a court appointing a prosecutor. But, apparently fearful that
the logic of that conclusion would lead to some of the hypotheti-
cals I have already noted, the Court said it had to be a "congru-
19. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
20. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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ous" interbranch appointment. The appointment can not be "in-
congruous."21 One searches the language of the Constitution and
the history of the Constitution in vain for any support for this
"incongruity" limitation on interbranch appointments (if, indeed,
there is any aut40rity for interbranch appointments in the Ap-
pointments Clause).
The second point about Morrison is that the Court was quite
hard pressed to distinguish recent cases such as Bowsher and
Chadha in upholding the independent counsel statute. It did so
on the ground that those cases involved attempts by Congress to
increase its own powers at the expense of the executive branch; in
other words, the earlier cases involved congressional usurpation of
executive authority.22 One could call this the Robin Hood doc-
trine of separation of powers-so long as Congress does not keep
for itself that which it takes from another branch, no constitu-
tional offense has been committed. The independent counsel stat-
ute takes an executive function and gives it to a stranger to both
branches, so it is constitutional.
The final point concerning Morrison is that the Court went be-
yond Humphrey's Executor,23 which upheld presidential removal
restrictions relating to FCC commissioners because they exercised
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative (rather than executive) au-
thorities. The Court went beyond Humphrey's Executor by say-
ing that the Congress can also place restrictions on the Presi-
dent's authority to remove purely executive. officers, and the
Court quite candidly admitted that independent counsel exercise
a purely executive function. The limiting principle for this notion
was as follows:
Although the counsel exercises no small amount of discretion
and judgment in deciding how to carry out her [executive] du-
ties under the Act, we simply do not see how the President's
need to control the exercise of that discretion is so central to the
functioning of the Executive Branch as to require as a matter of
constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the
President.24
One may conclude from this passage that so long as the Con-
21. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2611.
22. [d. at 2620.
23. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
24. Morrison, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.
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gress does not remove any vital organs from the President, it can
break off little pieces all it wants. When I read this passage, I
have to confess that my mind is crowded by a scene from a movie
well known to those in my generation-Monty Python and the
Holy Grail.25 There is a scene in which a knight in his shining
armor strides up to a place where another knight is denying him
passage, and a fight ensues. After awhile, one knight hacks off the
other knight's left arm, and the injured knight says, "A flesh
wound. Come on and fight." A moment later, the injured knight
loses his right arm. The fight continues until the armless knight is
on the ground on his torso, having been hacked half in two, and
as the other knight is galloping away, the injured knight yells,
"Come back, you coward. Fight like a man."
Well, I have to tell you that I think that the executive is the
injured knight and Morrison v. Olson is the first flesh wound. But
I am concerned that the Congress will continue to hack.
C. ALFRED C. AMAN. JR.*
Mr. Cooper has raised some challenging issues. He has sug-
gested a formalistic approach to separation of powers analysis
that relies heavily on the ability of courts to label certain govern-
mental actions as legislative, executive or judiCial. And though it
pays lip service to the notion that our three branches of govern-
ment are not and, of course, cannot be "hermetically sealed," it
has little toleration for various political mixtures of these powers.
My purpose today is not to analyze this approach in great de-
tail. Rather, my purpose is to ask a question: Why does formalism
seem particularly persuasive, now? Why do we find it increasingly
common in several recent Supreme Court opinions?
To answer this question, it is not possible to view the rise of
formalism in a vacuum. As an administrative as well as a consti-
tutionallaw professor, I cannot help but see this doctrine in con-
nection with other administrative and constitutional legal doc-
trines. I see it as connected, in part, to the Supreme Court's
25. Monty Python and the Holy Grail (National Film Trustee Co. 1974).
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
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attempt to revive the tenth amendment in National League of
Cities v. Usery.l I see it as part of attempts to put some teeth
into the Taking Clause. I see it as of a piece with what I believe
are attempts to revive the doctrine of substantive due process by
applying the first amendment in various regulatory contexts.2 Of
course, as an administrative lawyer, I am particularly interested
in the fact that, especially prior to Morrison v. Olson,s formalism
had grave implications for the kinds of mixtures of executive, leg-
islative and judicial powers commonly found in many administra-
tive agencies, especially independent agencies. As Justice Scalia
noted in his lower court opinion in Bowsher:4 "It has. . . always
been .difficult to reconcile Humphrey's Executor's 'headless
fourth branch' with a constitutional text and tradition establish-
ing three branches of government."11 Indeed, I think Justice
Scalia's views on these issues are not only interesting analytically,
but interesting from a historical perspective as well.
In 1933, four years after the stock market crash of 1929, then
Professor, and eventually, Justice Felix Frankfurter had this to
say about the age in which he lived and the problems he and his
generation then faced:
[I]n this the fourth winter of our discontent, it is no longer tim-
orous or ignorant to believe that this depression has a signifi-
cance very different from prior economic stresses in our national
history. The more things change the more they remain the same
is an epigram of comfortable cynicism. There are new periods in
history and we are in the midst of one of them.6
He, of course, was an advocate of the New Deal. In particular,
he was in favor of judicial restraint-a judicial approach to con-
stitutional challenges of legislative acts that usually deferred to
the judgments of political majorities, a direct contrast to the doc-
trine and approach spawned by Lochner v. New York. 7
Approximately 50 years later, former Professor, then Judge, but
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). This fully came to an end nine years later in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
2. See Aman, SEC v. Lowe: Professional Regulation and The First Amendment, 1985
SUP. CT. REV. 93, 145.
3. 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
4. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
5. Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1398 (D.D.C.), aII'd sub nom. Bowsher v.
Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
6. 22 YALE REV. 476 (1933).
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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soon to become Justice Scalia had this to say: "There are vast
tides in human history: The age of the Industrial Revolution, the
Age of Enlightenment. Ours will doubtless go down as the Age of
Deregulation in the history books of the future."8 '
While it is, perhaps, hyperbole to compare deregulation to ei-
ther the Industrial Revolution or to the Age of Enlightenment,
the Deregulatory Age does define a definitive moment. I would,
however, call this the Global Age.9
I believe we live in an age in which a new order is being de-
fined-one driven largely by global perspectives, global markets,
global problems and the need for global solutions. Law is not nec-
essarily a source of change, but it plays a very important role
when it comes to channeling change. The formalistic channel of
the separation of powers doctrine is, in many ways, tailor-made
for the beginnings of this global era and the anti-regulatory, cost-
consciousness that now contributes heavily to our perspective on
just what is or what should be the proper role of the federal gov-
ernment. The purity and rigor of the formalistic approach makes
the kinds of legislative compromises that typified the New Deal
Era highly suspect. It makes parts of the administrative state
constitutionally vulnerable while, by and large, allowing for in-
creases in presidential power.
The formalist separation of powers approach is somewhat akin
to a minimalist approach to the role of the national government.
A minimalist approach may be what the Founding Fathers as-
sumed the national government would take to governmental
problems. It may also be what they thought the separation of
powers principles written into our Constitution would produce.
But this kind of minimalism was to be the natural result of the
allocation of power among the branches of government that these
principles assured, coupled with the constitutional doctrine of
enumerated or delegated powers and basic notions of federalism.
Separation of powers principles were never intended to decide in-
dividual cases or controversies between two branches of govern-
ment. 10 They were broad, structural guarantees that emphasized
8. Scalia, Judicial Review of Administrative Action In An Era of Deregulation, 105
F.R.D. 321, 323 (1984).
9. For a detailed treatment of this theme, see Aman, Administrative Law In A Global
Era: Progress, Deregulatory Change and The Role of the Courts, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 701
(1989).
10. See generally Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Pow-
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balance as much as separation.
I am, however, getting a bit ahead of my story. Let me simply
assert that every age, perhaps every generation, seeks to institu-
tionalize its vision of change, and its vision of progress. In this
regard, law plays a very important role. Some reformers may feel
so strongly about their visions of progress that they wish to con-
stitutionalize them as well. While that does not necessarily mean
future changes will not eventually occur, constitutional ap-
proaches to the policy· issues of the day tend to remove them from
the political process and place them in the courts. This is nothing
new in our legal culture. But, as in the past, we must temper our
reforming zeal with the wisdom that few of us can, or ever will,
have a monopoly on constitutional truth, even if we think we
have a hotline to James Madison himself. An excessively formalis-
tic approach to separation of powers issues seriously risks consti-
tutionalizing a particular conception of liberty which should be
more amenable to the ebb and flow of the political process. Let
me pursue this point by taking the theme of this confer-
ence-"justice and liberty for all"-and very briefly examining it
over time.
Isaiah Berlin has written: "Almost every moralist in human his-
tory has praised freedom. Like happiness and goodness, like na-
ture and reality, the meaning of this term is so porous that there
is little interpretation that it seems able to resist."ll I do not pro-
pose to discuss the more than two hundred or more uses of this
word, as recorded by historians of ideas. I will, however, look at it
in the context of four eras-the era of the Founding Fathers, the
New Deal, the Civil Rights Era and finally, the Global Era. 12
As I have already noted, there is little doubt that separation of
powers and liberty were linked in the minds of the Founding Fa-
thers. But the concept of liberty that drove them was both a gen-
eral and a negative one. It was not based on the kind of individ-
ual rights perspective that applies when one of the specific Bill of
Rights provisions is applied to specific activities of a particular
person. For the Founding Fathers, separation of powers was
meant to guard against tyranny by anyone branch of govern-
ment. It was closely linked with the notion of checks and bal-
ers, 85 MICH. L. REV. 592 (1986).
11. I. BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 121 (1969).
12. This is a brief summary of a longer work now in progress, entitled: Conceptions of
Liberty And Separation of Powers Principles.
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ances. Some separation, to be sure, was necessary, but some com-
binations were also appropriate for purposes of checking or
balancing factions. Indeed, as Professor Kurland has argued,
"checks and balances suggested the joinder, not separation, of two
or more governmental agencies before action could be vali-
dated. . . . Balanced or mixed government involved separation,
but by way of providing different voices for different elements in
a society...."13 More significantly, separation of powers princi-
ples involved the allocation of power among the branches. They
were not intended to be used to decide individual cases. Indeed,
the very fact that power was diffuse meant that it would be diffi-
cult to pass laws and thereby intrude on the negative liberty of
individuals to be free from the national government. A kind of
negative liberty thus characterized the Founding Father's concep-
tion of freedom.
Real protection from possible excesses of national governmen-
tal control came in the form of the enumerated powers 'in the
Constitution. Early cases did not ask whether something was leg-
islative, executive or judicial as if one were playing a game of
"animal, vegetable or mineral." The Founding Fathers knew that
a jurisprudence of labels would not be appropriate, even without
anticipating the demands of the modern administrative state.
They wished to guard against factions and the tyranny of anyone
branch, but what the Constitution established was a political pro-
cess in which various interests were multiplied. A bill became law
only after it went through two very different houses of Congress
and was signed by the President. The Founding Fathers were not
at all clear on what they feared most. Some feared the Congress;
some feared an imperial executive. But the political process that
their scheme of government established, coupled with the doc-
trine of enumerated or delegated national powers, not to speak of
the concept of federalism, provided the textual and structural
protection from national power that they had in mind.
Almost from the very beginning of the Republic, however, one
major trend can be discerned: Power has flowed from the states
to the national government. The Supreme Court has greatly as-
sisted in this process. In McCulloch v. Maryland,!" for. example,
Justice Marshall interpreted the doctrine of enumerated powers
13. Kurland, supra note 10, at 593.
14. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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to include implied powers, and his gloss of the Necessary and
Proper Clause made it increasingly easy for the federal govern-
ment-if it chose-to legislate in certain areas. In addition, this
trend has continued and increased in the twentieth century, par-
ticularlyafter 1937, and it has been reinforced by a second major
trend: Not only has power flowed to the national government, but
it has increasingly flowed to the President as well.
The breadth of Marshall's opinions were somewhat cut back in
the litigation that followed the Civil War. The Court was just be-
ginning to deal with the fallout of the Industrial Revolution and
such technological innovations as railroads. An active federal reg-
ulatory role was not only new, but something the Court viewed
most skeptically. States rights and federalism were important val-
ues for the Court. As it interpreted the Commerce Clause and the
statutory terms of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,ll~ it tended to re-
solve disputes beween national and state power in favor of the
states. In the process, it often appeared to be reading a good deal
of Herbert Spencer into the Constitution.
But the Great Depression changed our perceptions of the role
of the national government. It was a major watershed. The con-
cept of liberty or freedom now took on a new, more collective
meaning. Liberty did not necessarily mean freedom from govern-
ment. Liberty could also be assured by some forms of governmen-
tal action. The political process seemed to be saying that our col-
lective liberty generated the need for collective federal action. A
nationally interdependent, albeit sick economy, now seemed to
need national solutions for national problems. The direct-indirect
tests that governed the Commerce Clause fell by the wayside. Ec-
onomic rights became almost exclusively the bailiwick of the leg-
islature. Separation of powers principles no longer turned out to
produce, substantively speaking, a minimalist form of national
government. With the growth of the national government that
then resulted, the limits on the national government no longer
were substantive. They were procedural. Individual rights now
had to be protected by specific clauses in the Constitution, and
not by the concept of separation of powers. Separation of powers
principles were only procedurally important. They were no longer
a substantive roadblock to nationally imposed solutions. Liberty
15. Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890, ch. 476, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982».
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was now defined by a political process highly motivated by the
poverty and desperation spawned by the Great Depression. Lib-
erty took on a new meaning.
In Carolene Products,t6 the Supreme Court codified its new ap-
proach to judicial review in a rather modern way-i.e., in a foot-
note. The Court now essentially deferred to congressional wisdom
when it came to economic rights, but it retained the right to re-
view closely, cases that involved so-called preferred freedoms like
the first amendment, or, as we were soon to see, the fourteenth
amendment. The administrative state established during and af-
ter the New Deal was politically popular and it grew.
In 1954, "liberty and justice for all" took on yet another focus
when the Court decided Brown v. Board of EducationY Brown
triggered an era in which the liberty that courts now sought vigor-
ously to protect consisted largely of the individual rights of dis-
crete and insular minorities. The legally imposed system of
apartheid in the South fell as Jim Crow laws were declared un-
constitutional. Modern first amendment theory came into being
as the values of the first amendment were truly put to the test,
and were developed by the civil rights struggles of Martin Luther
King and others. Similarly, courts began to take a strict scrutiny
approach when dealing with the issues of racial discrimination.
The concept of a suspect class was born. Juries and public schools
were integrated. The voting rights of blacks were furthered.
We now are beginning to see the emergence of yet another era
in which the concept of liberty is once again taking a new turn. In
the global, post-World War II world of today, issues spawned by a
world-wide competition, the activities of multinational corpora-
tions and the multicultural demands of living and succeeding in
an interdependent global economy tend to increasingly color our
perceptions of and responses to the issues of the day. A crude
kind of globalism is developing. We are beginning to conceptual-
ize our regulatory and governmental responsibilities differently.
There is, on the part of some reformers, a desire to wipe the regu-
latory slate clean, to clear away huge parts of the administrative
state, particularly that which was established during the New
Deal. This, it is argued, would enable individuals and corpora-
tions to compete more effectively in a global world.. Congress,
16. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 nA (1938).
17. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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however, has not always been willing to lead the deregulatory
charge. Congress seems better at creating new structures than it
is at revising, amending or repealing old ones. Indeed, in this new
Global Era, Congress increasingly seems to be the weakest of the
three branches when it comes to defining its contours. The execu-
tive branch has been more than willing to fill this void. Coincid-
ing with the appearance of the issues of a new global age is the
continued growth of presidential power. What Congress seems
unable to do legislatively, the executive has been willing to do
through executive orders and the Article Two duty to "take care
that the laws are faithfully executed."l8 This is particularly true
when it comes to deregulatory policies.l9 The presidency is the
one office in our system that, theoretically at least, can take a
global view, and many of our new policy initiatives have been
coming from the executive branch of government.
These changes in policy direction and, I would argue, the de-
mands of a new, more global economic order, are beginning to
show up in the law. There are now new signs of legal ferment in
various areas of constitutional law: Some cases question previous
relationships between courts and administrative agencies; some
seem to incorporate the notion of property rights into the first
amendment; some cases have even tried to resuscitate the tenth
amendment or establish property as a fundamental right under
the fourteenth amendment. Still other approaches now wish to
apply separation of powers principles as if they were rules for de-
cision in individual cases, and impose a kind of formalism to re-
strain national power at a time when there seem to be few sub-
stantive limits to its use.
It is my view that the new conceptions of liberty now forming
should be legislatively imposed, and not constitutionally man-
dated. We want a constitution for all seasons, but we must be
careful not to constitutionalize all of our visions of reform. Some
reformers, however, are so certain of the truth of their deregu-
latory position that they wish to constitutionalize it for all times.
By linking their visions of progress with their interpretations of
the Founding Father's vision, a concept of liberty that restricts
certain federal actions can be enshrined in the Constitution, one
more easily protected by courts than by legislatures. But I doubt
18. u.s. CONST. art. II, § 3.
19. For a more extended treatment of these themes, see Aman, supra note 9.
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seriously whether we would want to do this or to go back to a
truly minimalist era-'one in which the President as well as Con-
gress and the courts played a minimal role. Indeed, I would note .
that this does not really seem to· be what we are doing. The end
result of cases like Bowsher u. Synar20 and INS u. Chadha 21 is
actually an increase in presidential power. But there are limits to
the extent to which executive power can be increased to assure
rational policymaking at the national leveL At some point, Con-
gress itself must become responsibly involved.
Indeed, the major separation of powers problem we face today
is not the power of administrative agencies or the national gov-
ernment, per se, but the decline of Congress as an effective, re-
sponsible and active branch of government. Congress needs to
more fully and courageously define the Global Era in which we
live. Perhaps institutional reforms of that body will be necessary
before this can be accomplished. There is little question that the
office of the presidency specifically, and the executive branch in
general, is capable of a more global view of issues and problems.
This only increases the desire to use the executive, and perhaps
the courts, to effectuate the changes in policy appropriate for the
Global Era in which we live. But such changes should not be ac-
complished by the judiciary deregulating the administrative state
by declaring independent regulatory commissions unconstitu-
tional or voiding congressional policy judgments because, as in
Bowsher, we think an obscure governmental official somehow im-
properly mixes legislative and executive powers. Congress must
reassert itself and face the global realities of the late twentieth
century. To the extent change continues to occur without the di-
rect participation of Congress, it may soon be necessary to ask
whether the American Revolution is over. Do we now want a king
/
or at least a modified parliamentary system of government? At
some point we must face up to the possibility of fundamental
structural change, if Congress does not playa more effective role.
Let me conclude. Every generation has a vision of liberty and
progress, but we should be careful when it comes to constitution-
alizing these visions. As we search for the holy grail, it is perhaps
wise to realize that future generations will also have to make use
of a flexible governmental system to carry out their visions of
20. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
21. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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change and progress. They must also have a chance to address
and change the world they inherit.
Thus,. as we ponder the various interpretive possibilities
presented by separation of powers questions, it is, perhaps, wise
to recall the following folktale:
There is an Indian story-at least I heard it as an Indian
story-about an Englishman who, having been told that the
world rested on a platform which rested on the back of an ele-
phant which rested in turn on the back of a turtle, asked: what
did the turtle rest on? Another turtle. And that turtle?
"Ah, Sahib, after that it is turtles all the way down."22
D. CYNTHIA R. FARINA*
Unlike Professor Aman, my purpose here is to join issue with
what he calls the formalist approach to separation of powers. One
might also call it the "literalist" approach; that is, a notion that
the sum and substance of this concept are captured in the words
themselves-"separation of powers"-and mean nothing more, or
less, than a division of distinguishable strands of governmental
authority traditionally conceived of as the executive, the legisla-
tive and the judicial powers.
My thesis is that the literalist approach is both wrong and dan-
gerous: wrong as an historical matter, and dangerous as an ana-
lytic framework for approaching issues of interbranch relations in
contemporary government. Let me begin with the "wrong."
Discussions of the meaning of separation of powers in our Con-
stitution almost always start with the man that Hamilton and
Madison refer to in The Federalist as "the celebrated Montes-
quieu."l You are probably familiar with the often quoted passage
of Montesquieu's work in which he argues:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
22. C. GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 28-29 (1973).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell University. For fuller treatment of many of the
ideas discussed here, see Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in
the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 324 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 523 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
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same person, . . . there can be no liberty; because apprehensions
may arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyran-
nical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not sepa-
rated from the legislative and executive.2
He concludes with a dire warning: "There would be an end of
every thing, were the same man, or the same body. . . to exercise
those three powers. . . ."3
This passage certainly supports a literalist interpretation of
separation of powers. It conceives the task of governing as com-
prised of three distinct functions and insists that those functions
must be divided and given to separate organs of government if
the liberty of the people is to be secure. Other portions of The
Spirit of Laws support a different interpretation but, without
doubt, the literalist vision of separation of powers does find a
home in Montesquieu's works. And it was this vision that was
enormously attractive to the Americans in 1776. In the years im-
mediately preceding the Revolution, they had tried to understand
what went wrong with the British Constitution, that British rule
could have become so abusive. Ultimately, they concluded that
the king, with the help of his ministers, had managed to subvert
the independence of Parliament. By gaining control of Parlia-
ment, he had gained control of the legislative power; when this
power was joined with his own executive power, he could then
become tyrannical.4 .
Thus, the early Americans believed they had witnessed the
proof of what Montesquieu said: evil results when you fail to
maintain a separation, a division, between the executive and leg-
islative powers. When they set out to design their own systems of
government-which as of 1776 would have been primarily the
state constitutions, for there was yet no sense of anything but a
loose confederation on the federal level-they were determined to
learn from Britain's mistakes. Although the precise structure dif-
fered from state to state, these early constitutions tended to share
key characteristics. At least formally, they provided for a strict
division of powers,li and they deliberately denied the chief execu-
2. MONTESQUlEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 174 (T. Nugent trans. 1873).
3. [d.
4. See G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 33-34, 42, 79,
143-48, 156-58 (1969).
5. See M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND· THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 119-20 (1967).
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tive, the governor, powers such as the veto power and the ap-
pointment power, which the early Americans believed had ena-
bled the king to subvert the independence of Parliament.s
But what a disillusionment. Under these early divisionist con-
stitutions, the state legislatures not only made and changed laws,
with abandon, but they began to take over executive and judicial'
tasks as well.7 As the decade after the Revolution proceeded, po-
litical observers increasingly concluded that these early constitu-
tions had, quite unwittingly, created a new species of dangerous
concentration of powers-this time in the hands of the legisla-
ture.8 They also began to recognize the weakness of a structural
theory that focused on formally dividing power without providing
any affirmative mechanism to restrain usurpationist behavior and
to counteract the gradual movement of power over time.9 What
was their solution? Ultimately they went back to another ancient
structural theory of government, the theory of mixed government.
In its classical form, mixed government tries to achieve stable,
controlled government by assuring that the major orders of soci-
ety-the king, the aristocracy, and the common people-each
have power in the government sufficient to prevent anyone order
from imposing on any of the others.1o Like separation of powers,
the theory of mixed government tries to control power through a
structural device. But unlike the literalist interpretation of sepa-
ration of powers, which focuses on parceling out government
functions to different hands, mixed government tries to avoid tyr-
anny by ensuring that different hands are jointly responsible for
the performance of key functions. 11
In 1776, the message of mixed government- that you could re-
strain government by forcing authority to be shared so that power
counterbalances power-was rejected by most Americans. After
all, the theory seemed rooted in assumptions about the natural
order of things-that society was a three-tiered hierarchy of a
king, aristocracy, and common people-that were antithetical to a
people who thought they were establishing a democracy. But with
6. See id. ~t '134-35.
7. See id. at 143; T. JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 120 (W. Reden ed.
1955).
8. See T. JEFFERSON, supra note 7, at 120; THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note I, at 334-
43.
9. See generally M. VILE, supra note 5, at 143-44; G. WOOD, supra note 4, at 446-53.
10. See M. VILE, supra note 5, at 33-35.
11. See id. at 33.
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the failure of the early divisionist constitutions, influential politi-
cal thinkers began to reassess the theory of mixed government. 12
I will not detail here the process by which American political
thought managed to cut loose the critical idea of shared, counter-
balancing power from the class-based roots of mixed government.
What is important for our present discussion is that by 1787, the
cutting loose had been accomplished. Once the idea of shared,
counterbalancing power became, if you will, "available" to Ameri-
can political theorists, it could become the affirmative mechanism
of restraint that separation of powers in its literalist interpereta-
tion lacked. The result was to create, by 1787, a new and uniquely
American vision of what separation of powers means.
Thus, we see Madison urging the delegates in Philadelphia to
look beyond the goal of simply dividing power and, instead, to
craft a governmental structure that affirmatively seeks balance.
He says to them:
If a Constitutional discrimination of departments on paper were
a sufficient security to each agst. encroachments of the others,
all further provisions would indeed be superfluous. But experi-
ence has taught us a distrust of that security; and that it is nec-
essary to introduce such a balance of powers and interests, as
will guarantee the provisions on paper,l3
Later, the Constitution is attacked for disregarding separation
of powers by allowing, in several instances, one branch to share a
form' of power not rightfully its own. What is Madison's response
in The Federalist? He turns that argument around on itself. He
says: "[U]nless these departments be so far connected and
blended, as to give each a constitutional controul over the others,
the degree of separation which the maxim requires as essential to
a free government, can never in practice, be duly maintained."H
Balance was the recurring theme in how the Framers talked
about what they created. James Wilson, the influential delegate
from Pennsylvania, says: "[I]n government, the perfection of the
whole depends on the balance of the parts. . . . Each part acts
and is acted upon, supports and is supported, regulates and is
regulated by the rest. "11\ Alexander Hamilton, speaking to the
12. See id. at 145-48.
13. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 77 (M. Farrand ed. 1911).
14. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 332 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
15. Sharp, The Classical American Doctrine of "The Separation of Powers," 2 U. CHI.
L. REV. 385, 416 n.59 (1935).
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New York Ratifying Convention, states: "The true principle of
government is this: make the system complete in its structure;
give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts; and the powers
you give it will never affect your security."16
This history suggests that our tendency to talk about the con-
stitutional structure as one of separation of powers and checks
and balances can be misleading, for it implies a distinction be-
tween those two ideas which, for the Framers, did not really exist.
By the time of the ratification, the prevailing understanding of
"separation of powers" was no longer a simplistic call for dividing
conceptually distinct government functions. It had come to con-
note something far more subtle and intricate than mere abstractly
logical division. It had come to connote the expectation that,
through the carefully orchestrated sharing of power, power ,would,
over time, be able to counterbalance power.
In sum, the literalist interpretation is wrong as an historical
matter. It isa conception of separation of powers that may accu-
rately reflect where American political thought was in 1776, but
this conception had been rejected, or at least radically modified,
by 1787 in favor of a more complex, and more effective, vision of
separation of powers. In the 1787 vision, the critical concept is
not the division of powers, but the balance of power.
Now, why does any of this matter? This brings me to my sec-
ond objection to the literalist interpretation, which is that it is a
dangerous conception upon which to approach issues of inter-
branch relations in contemporary government. It is dangerous for
two reasons.
In the first place, if the literalist interpretation of separation of
powers is correct, then the reality of contemporary American gov-
ernment cannot be squared with the Constitution. It is hardly a
revelation to point out that the modern administrative state is a
world where the three traditional "powers" are commingled regu-
larly and on a grand scale. This is a reality which, even with the
present momentum in favor of deregulation, is not likely to signif-
icantly change. It is a reality that is hopelessly at odds with the
literalist conception of separation of powers. If legal theory be-
comes hopelessly at odds with reality, something is going to give.
And, since the reality of the administrative state is unlikely to
16. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 331 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
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change, the real risk is that we will come to regard separation of
powers as an anachronism: It was a simple and elegant theory
suited to the simple and elegant eighteenth century, but life in
the twentieth century is never simple and rarely elegant, and sep-
aration of powers is a luxury America can no longer afford. If we
reach the point of paying only lip service to separation of powers,
we will have abandoned one of the principal constitutional de-
vices for controlling government at a time when the level of ex-
tant federal power is greater than at any point in our history,
without having adopted any alternative theory of constraint. And
that is dangerous.
If, however, we recognize the essence of separation of powers
not as an obsession with maintaining a particular division of pow-
ers but rather as an ongoing striving for a balance of power
among the power centers of government, then we have a legal the-
ory that can deal with the fact that regulatory statutes have radi-
cally altered the pattern of government power. Then we can say
that it is all right that these new configurations of power have
evolved, provided that new pattens of counterbalance emerge to
provide restraint.
Now, I do not mean to suggest that this more fluid, contextu-
ally-sensitive conception of separation of powers makes for easy
answers to contemporary questions of interbranch relations. It is
enormously difficult to determine whether new concentrations of
powers are adequately counterbalanced and, if not, where and
how counterbalance is to be found. But this is an interpretation
of separation of powers that has a chance to survive and meaning-
fully function as a theory for controlling government power in the
twentieth century because, unlike the literalist interpretation, it
is a theory that can accommodate and respond to the reality of
the administrative state.
The second sense in which the literalist interpretation is dan-
gerous is that is typically put forth as a predicate for arguing that
the President's position is being unconstitutionally undermined
by a particular statutory arrangement. On its face, of course, the
literalist interpretation does not favor anyone branch over the
others. In fact, however, it almost always becomes a president-
favoring interpretation because its proponents conjoin it with (1)
an expansive view of the scope of the executive power and the
meaning of the Take Care Clause, and/or (2) an historical refer-
ence to the Framers' fear of usurpation by the legislature and
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their concomitant determination to provide for a strong presi-
dent. So, for example, the literalist interpretation is often ad-
vanced to insist that the only constitutional salvation for the in-
dependent agencies is increased presidential control.
I will not dwell here on whether the literalists are being inter-
nally inconsistent when they demand that the President have
control over entities much of whose power would be categorized
as "legislative" and "adjudicative" if the traditional labels were
applied. For the moment, I simply want to focus on the fact that
the literalist interpretation is now generally invoked to favor the
President in interbranch power struggles. Because of this fact, the
literalist interpretation has the capacity to propel us towards pre-
cisely the danger the Framers were trying to avoid.
The Americans' experience, first with Britain and then in the
Confederation period, taught them that power becomes dangerous
when it is disproportionately concentrated; that is, when a gov-
ernment system is out of balance. Whether the imbalance is in
the executive branch (the King who had subverted Parliament) or
in the legislative branch (state legislatures who wielded power
with abandon) the consequence is the same-abuse of power and
oppression. So they set up a system that tried to place the parts
of government in balance and contained mechanisms to maintain
that balance.
But, over two hundred years, American society changed. In par-
ticular, the national government moved to intervene in virtually
every aspect of our economic and social life, thus greatly increas-
ing the level of extant federal power. Especially important is the
manner in which this intervention has been accomplished: Con-
gress has delegated a considerable portion of its power to make
public policy to agencies. If Congress then policed how agencies
use this power, if it monitored them and intervened to correct
their policy judgments in a regular and systematic fashion, we
might conclude that although the absolute level of federal power
has increased, the relative distribution-that is, the balance of
power-has not significantly changed. But what has tended to
happen instead is that the President is far more successful than
Congress in directing the course of regulatory policymaking by
administrative agencies.
Several things contribute to the President's edge over Congress.
Some are constitutional, some are statutory, and some are cus-
tomary. One of the most important is the structural difference
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between the two branches. Congress is a collegial body operating
under a complicated set of procedures. To speak its mind, it must
mobilize a majority of several hundred people. By contrast, the
President is one individual, acting as the undisputed head of a
group of people whose job it is to see that his policies are pur-
sued, by cajolery where possible and arm-twisting where neces-
sary. The Framers very deliberately structured the Office of the
President in this way. They recognized that the executive branch
had to be capable of decisive action, expeditiousness, consistency
and coordination if it were going to be successful in conducting
foreign policy and maintaining domestic law and order. The very
qualities that make a unitary president good at those tasks can
prove just as effective when turned to the task of directing regula-
tory policymaking.
In other words, one of the most constitutionally significant con-
sequences of the creation of the administrative state has been
that power which Congress gives away to administrative agencies
tends to be power which flows towards the President. The bigger
the pool of regulatory power up for grabs, the more serious the
shift in the balance of power may become. The literalist interpre-
tation of separation of powers not only fails to recognize and deal
with the entirely new set of power dynamics created by broadly
delegative regulatory statutes, but also, through its consistently
pro-president stance, exacerbates the likelihood of government
moving dangerously out of balance.
Now it is true-as proponents of the literalist interpretation
often point out-that when the Framers though about the future,
they expected the threat of imbalance to come from the legisla-
ture. But their fears must not be divorced from the context. They
saw the legislative power as, in Madison's words, "more extensive
and less susceptible of precise limits" than the executive or judi-
cial powers. 17 Therefore, the body that would hold this power was
much more dangerous than any other branch. Two hundred years
later, however, much of the legislative power has moved away
from Congress through delegation. The Framers would be the
first ones to tell us that the threat follows the power. As Madison
once wrote to Jefferson, "Wherever the real power in a Govern-
ment lies, there is the danger of oppression."IB Unless this recog-
17. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 14, at 334.
18. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), quoted in G.
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nition is the animating core of our theory of separation of powers,
we will have lost sight of one of the most important lessons the
Framers tried to pass on to us.
E. JONATHAN R. MACEY*
Much is said about the separation of powers by liberals and
conservatives alike. It is high on the list of sacred cows in Ameri-
can political life. On the one hand, everybody is for it, and no-
body is against it. On the other hand, nobody ever seems to be
able to articulate precisely why this vague, almost ritualistic in-
cantation is entitled to the veneration it appears to receive. This
lack of provenance feeds upon itself because people all along the
political spectrum are able to justify whatever political outcome
they prefer simply by claiming that those views somehow are
mandated by the separation of powers.
For example, the outcome of INS v. Chadha,l an important
separation of powers case involving the legislative veto, has been
defended by a colleague of mine on the grounds that the legisla-
tive veto that was declared unconstitutional violated the human
rights of certain foreign graduate students who had obtained the
permission of the Immigration and Naturalization Service to re-
main in the country after their visas had expired, only to have
this suspension of deportation vetoed by a resolution of the U.S.
House of Representatives. This is an example of the incoherence
that surrounds the separation of powers.
After all, human rights are one thing and the separation of
powers under the Constitution is quite another. Indeed, in theory
it would be quite possible to have a system of government that
systematically denied individuals their basic human rights, but
retained a rigid separation of powers; just as it is conceivable that
a system of government that had no separation of powers might
provide its citizenry with a wide range of individual liberties. In-
dividual rights and the separation of powers are distinct attrib-
WOOD, supra note 4, at 410.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University.
1. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
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utes of our constitutional regime, and as such, they serve special-
ized functions. To defend the Chadha decision on the basis that
it vindicated the individual rights of the plaintiffs is not to de-
fend it at all, since the case purports to be about whether the
legislative veto violates the Constitution by upsetting the system
of checks and balances that comprises a core element of the
Constitution.
The lack of understanding surrounding the purposes that the
separation of powers is supposed to serve within the constitu-
tional scheme makes it clear to me that a better appreciation of
the theoretical underpinnings of the separation of powers is sorely
needed. Without such a theory, cases like Chadha will never be
properly understood and, perhaps more importantly, the separa-
tion of powers will never assume its proper place within constitu-
tional theory.
It is my thesis that the separation of powers in the U.S. Consti-
tution is one of a number of constitutional features designed to
make rent-seeking2 more difficult by raising the decisions costs of
government activity. Constructing a government of separated
powers raises the decisions costs of governmental action because
the checking and balancing performed by the judiciary and the
executive requires interest groups seeking to obtain favorable leg-
islation to obtain the consent of these rival branches at some
point in the process. Obtaining such consent is costly. Therefore,
a system of separated powers characterized not by compart-
mentalization, but by checks and balances, will raise the costs of
governmental action and will result in a relatively lower level of
interest group wealth transfer activity. This diminution in wealth
transfer activity, in turn, will lead to an increase in aggregate na-
tional wealth.
The American vision of a constitutional separation of powers
differed significantly from the continental vision of separation of
powers in one fundamental respect. Under the continental theory,
a government of separated powers was a government character-
ized by a functional compartmentalization of power, with each
branch operating independently of the others in virtually all re-
2. Rent-seeking refers to the attempt to obtain economic rents (i.e., payments for the
use of an economic asset in excess of the market price) through government intervention
in the market. A classic example of rent-seeking is the attempt by domestic automobile
companies to obtain protective tariffs against the importation of automobiles manufac-
tured abroad.
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spects.3 The American approach to constitutional governance
parted significantly from the continental vision. Rather than be-
ing characterized by a system of functionally separate powers, af-
ter much debate, the American Constitution substituted a model
of mutual inter-dependency in place of the continental model of
strict compartmentalization. Under the American model, "each
power center would remain dependent upon the others for the fi-
nal efficacy in its social designs.'"
Thus, with the defeat of the Anti-Federalists, who advocated
the highly compartmentalized approach, Ii and the ratification of
the American Constitution, a distinctly American conception of
the separation of powers emerged. The best way to view the role
of the separation of powers within this conceptual framework is
as a part of a larger overall system of checks and balances. And
it is the operation of this system of checks and balances, of which
the separation of powers is a part, that has made the American
Constitution an original document of genius.
At the core of the American system of separating powers
through a regime of checks and balances was the idea that gov-
ernmental actors could not be trusted. Indeed, as I have argued
elsewhere, the only coherent explanation for the system of checks
and balances in general and the doctrine of separation of powers
in particular is to raise the decisions costs of government in order
to force economic activity out of the public domain and into the
private domain.6 Checks and balances could also provide for the
protection of individual citizens by making it more difficult for
government to pass laws. In other words, if the system of checks
and balances does nothing else, it makes it more difficult to enact
statutes.
Under the American system of separated powers, the federal
government would serve as a check on the states; the states, aided
3. 2 C. DE MALBERG, CONTRIBUTION A LA THEORIE GENERALE DE L'ETAT § 1, at 23-34
(1922).
4. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 3 (2d ed. 1988).
5. Gordon Wood has argued that the Anti-Federalists' position on the separation of
powers was motivated by strategic, rather than political considerations. Specifically, he
argues that after the Anti-Federalists had lost the battle against the adoption of a federal
constitution, "[alII they could do was attack the federal government in those mechanical
Enlightenment terms most agreeable to the thought of the Federalists: the division and
balancing of power." G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 at 548
(1969).
6. See Macey, Transactions Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice
Model: An Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REV. 471 (1988).
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by municipal authorities, would serve as a check on each other;
and, at the federal level, the legislative, executive and judicial
branches would restrain one other. But for a system of checks and
balances to work, there must be a sharing of power. And it is this
sharing of power that befuddles many who find it difficult to rec-
oncile the mutuality inherent in the checking and balancing func-
tion with the separation that is the inevitable byproduct of the
compartmentalization that is an implicit part of a separation of
powers.
The notion ofa government of separated powers at first ap-
pears fundamentally inconsistent with the notion of a government
of checks and balances because, after all, a government cannot
very well have separate powers if those powers are dependent in
very significant ways on the cooperation and support of the other
branches. But the tension between the idea of separation of pow-
ers and the idea of a government of checks and balances disap-
pears once we recognize that a system of separated powers is a
necessary precondition to a properly functioning system of checks
and balances. After all, one branch of government cannot very
well check another branch unless it has at least some measure of
independence and separateness. It is in this sense that the U.S.
Constitution embraces the idea of separation of powers. The U.S.
Constitution provides for a separation of powers in order to give
each branch the ability to curb the activities of the others. Thus,
under the American system of checks and balances, the federal
judiciary has the power to declare acts of Congress unconstitu-
tional. Similarly, the chief executive has the power to veto con-
gressional acts for any reason he sees fit. These independent pow-
ers are, at the same time, manifestations of a government of
separate powers as well as essential elements in the system of
checks and balances.
The very existence of a system of separation of powers within
our constitutional framework is attributable to the fact that such
a separation is a necessary precondition to a system of checks and
balances.7 This system of checks and balances was in turn insti-
tuted in order to raise the costs of governmental decision-making.
Thus, while the continental variety of separated powers results in
7. Separation of powers in the Continental system preserved procedural regularities by
ensuring that laws applied equally to all. This too, of course, was retained in the American
Constitutional regime.
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a strengthening of individual branches, the U.S. variety results in
a diminution of the independent authority of the branches be-
cause cooperation among the branches must be obtained in order
for the government to act.
The Framers had two very good reasons for concluding that
raising the costs of governmental action was crucial to the welfare
of the new republic. First, the Framers recognized that politi-
cians, like other people, are rational economic actors. As such
they can be counted upon to act self-interestedly when making
governmental decisions. The Framers' famous observation that
"enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm" of govern-
ment8 was only the tip of the iceberg. The central motivating
force behind the Constitution was the desire to form a govern-
ment that would protect individual freedom and liberty against
the systematic incursions of self-serving government officials.
Implicit in this idea is not only the obvious point that govern-
ment should be limited, but a rather more subtle point, which has
virtually disappeared from mainstream approaches to constitu-
tional theory over the past fifty years; namely, that the Framers
recognized that "the future of American politics will not be one
long, glorious reenactment of the American Revolution."9 The im-
plication of this observation is that, with the exception of a few,
largely unrepresentative activists and academics, people for the
most part want to ignore politics and pursue happiness and self-
fulfillment in a private rather than a public setting. Such pursuits
are impossible in the presence of a monolithic central government
run by selfish politicians who, by and large, are intent on trans-
ferring wealth from the politically uninterested to the politically
well-connected at every turn.
As the Framers recognized, a strong system of checks and bal-
ances would curb politicians' ability to make such wealth trans-
fers by raising the decisions costs of government. In doing so the
constitutional scheme would serve as a· deterrent to the natural
proclivity of most voters in a liberal democracy to "try to turn the
government toward serving" their "immediate well being."lo Citi-
zens could thus be left alone to pursue happiness and fulfillment
in the private sphere except in times of genuine national crisis.
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 60 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
9. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1020 (1984).
10. Malbin, Factions and Incentives in Congress, PUB. INT., Winter 1987, at 91, 92.
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Thus a system of checks and balances implemented through a
separation of governmental powers protects individual citizens
from pernicious wealth transfers effectuated by self-serving politi-
cians, and thereby frees the citizenry to pursue happiness and
self-fulfillment in the private sphere, rather than in the public
sphere where happiness and self-fulfillment for one group gener-
ally comes at the expense of another, less politically astute group.
When the Founders began to think about the theoretical under-
pinnings of the Constitution they were devising, it was their view
that a "new science of politics" was needed for the new world. ll
The system of checks and balances that emerged in the Constitu-
tion reflected this new political science. What was new about the
Framers' political science was its complete abandonment of reli-
ance on public spiritedness and the virtue of governmental actors
as sources of good government, and its embrace of the view that
American citizens must be protected from the lesser motives of
politicians if the new government was to survive. It was this phi-
losophy that led to the emergence of a government of checks and
balances.
As Daniel Patrick Moynihan has observed, it is unfortunate
that the Founding Fathers placed so much emphasis on their
practicality, and called so little attention to their belief that they
were proceeding on what they saw as a science of politics.12 The
scientific underpinnings of the Framers has been refined over
time and is inconsistent with what economists have come to call
the "economic theory of regulation" or public choice. This theory
begins with the same economic premises endorsed by the Fram-
ers, namely that "individuals, regardless of the decision-making
environment, are motivated primarily by private interests rather
than the public interest."13 As with the Framers, public choice
economists have been able to use the economic assumption of ra-
tional self-interest "to develop new insights into the operation of
the political process."l. As has been developed extensively else-
where, the basic implication of this theory is that laws are prod-
ucts which are supplied and demanded by interested groups in
11. Moynihan, The New "Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Government, PUB.
INT.• WINTER 1987, at 22, 22.
12. Id. at 24.
13. Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 191, 191
(1988).
14. Id.
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precisely the same way as other economic goods. The market for
law is dominated by those special-interest groups that are able to
provide political· support and other favors to politicians in the
most efficient way. The lowest cost providers of political support
are generally small, well-organized special interests able to over-
come the free-rider and other collective action problems that typ-
ically plague disaggregated individuals involved in the political
process.
Recognizing the phenomenon of. special-interest group domina-
tion of the political processors (which the Framers referred to as
the problem of faction)/ll the separation of powers, like the rest
of the system of checks and balances, was designed to mitigate
the problem of interest group domination of the political process.
Thus the Presentment Clause, the bicamerality requirement, the
presidential veto, the power of judicial review, the fact that the
President and the members of both houses of Congress have
unique political constituencies, are all easily understood in light
of the public choice model. 16 The goal of the Framers was to
make governmental decision-making more difficult in order to re-
duce the power and domination of special interest groups in the
political process. The Framers, in other words, fully anticipated
Buchanan and Tullock's classic 1962 work, The Calculus of Con-
sent, which provides a concise model of how a system of checks
and balances serves to retard the pace of governmental decision-
making by raising the decisions costs of government.
Thus it seems clear that the separation of powers serves three
distinct but inter-related purposes within the constitutional
scheme. First, it is designed to effectuate a strong system of
checks and balances by reducing the power of individual politi-
cians in order to ensure that political power is divided and shared
among the various branches of government. Second, by making it
more difficult for Congress to pass laws, individual citizens are
not forced into a preoccupation with political life, and are able to
lead private lives free from fear of government intervention and
the need to lobby for forbearance from excessive regulation. Fi-
nally, the system of checks and balances, of which the separation
of powers is a part, serves to reduce the problem of special-inter-
15. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J. Madison).
16. For a fuller explanation of the public choice underpinnings of the structure of gov-
ernment, see Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory inter-
pretation: An interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986).
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est group activity by making it more difficult for such groups to
obtain legislation that transfers wealth to themselves from less
politically active elements in society.I7
The above discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the
separation of powers has significant practical implications for
constitutional lawmaking. I wish to focus attention on two of
those implications. The first concerns the so-called "line-item
veto," and the second concerns the legislative veto discussed
above. It is generally believed that both of these types of veto
provisions would, for differing reasons, be unconstitutional. In-
deed, as mentioned earlier, the legislative veto has already been
declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. But in light of
the discussion above, any constitutional analysis of these provi-
sions must center around the extent to which such provisions
raise the decisions costs of government by strengthening the con-
stitutional system of checks and balances. Consistent with the
discussion above, if these provisions represent an attempt by one
branch to deprive another of its ability to act within its constitu-
tionally mandated sphere of influence, then they should be
viewed as highly suspect. On the other hand, if these provisions
simply reflect an effort by one branch or the other to exercise its
traditional checking function over another branch, then they
should be upheld as consistent with the constitutional scheme. In
other words, instances of negative control should be respected,
but they must be distinguished from instances of over-reaching
by one branch or another that reflect attempts to deprive a rival
branch of its ability to act within its proper sphere. Negative au-
thority, which the separation of powers brings to the forefront of
the system of checks and balances, must be distinguished from
positive authority. The Federalists were "convinced of 'the neces-
17. The above description of the role of the separation of powers within the constitu-
tional scheme is consistent with the idea that the legislature was a source of special con-
cern to the Framers:
In the new system, however, said Madison, the very structure of the government
was designed to prevent "those encroachments which lead to a tyrannical con-
centration of all the powers of government in the same hands," particularly in
those of the legislature, which had become to the Federalists, "the real source of
danger to the American Constitutions." Since "experience in all the States had
evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to absorb all power into its vor-
tex," the Federalists, like the constitutional reformers in the states, had become
convinced of "the necessity of giving every defensive authority to the other de-
partments that was consistent with republican principles."
G. WOOD, supra note 5, at 550.
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sity of giving every defensive authority to the other departments
that was consistent with republican principles.' "18
It is clear that the presidential veto power has been used very
sparingly in recent years. The most likely reason for this is the
ability of Congress to pass bills it knows to be important to the
President by bundling them with riders containing unrelated ap-
propriations full of pork barrel projects and other side payments
to interest groups. Often, the President must accede to these
wasteful interest group wealth transfers in order to obtain the en-
actment of essential governmental programs. As Clinton Rossiter
has pointed out,
the President often feels compelled to sign bills full of dubious
grants and subsidies rather than risk a breakdown in the work of·
whole departments. While it salves his conscience and cools his
anger to announce publicly that he would veto these if he could,
most Congressmen have learned to pay no attention to his
protests.19
An obvious means to resolve the problem of strategic packaging
by Congress is the adoption of the so-called "line-item veto,"
which would permit the President to veto the particular portions
of larger bills that he finds objectionable, rather than being
forced to "accept or reject the entire thing, swallowing the bitter
with the sweet."20 Most commentators have concluded that the
line-item veto would be unconstitutiona1.21 Their grounds for this
determination are quite vague, however, focusing on such general-
ities as whether Congress may statutorily expand the meaning of
the term "bill,"22 and whether a line-item veto would unconstitu-
tionally constrain the ability of each house to control their own
procedural rules. 23
But once the separation of powers is seen as a method of reduc-
ing governmental power by encouraging the "negative exercise of
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 254 (1956).
20. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 265.
21. See id. at 265-66; Note, Is a Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J.
838 (1987); HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., ITEM VETO: STATE EXPERIENCE
AND ITS ApPLICATION TO THE FEDERAL SITUATION 164-76 (Comm. Print 1986).
22. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 266 (calling this the "core issue" in the line-item veto
debate).
23. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings."). Of course, if each branch of Congress agreed to present its statutes to the Presi-
dent individually, this problem would disappear.
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power" and thereby forcing the sharing of power among co-equal
branches, the constitutionality of the line-item veto becomes
clear. The line-item veto does not enhance the power of the Presi-
dent in the sense of giving him control over the legislative agenda
or over the internal workings of Congress. The line-item veto en-
hances the power of the' President. only in the negative sense that
it enables him to thwart the ability of Congress to effectuate nar-
row, interest group wealth, transfers that do not have the support
of the only elected official who represents a nationwide
constituency.
An additional reason for supporting the constitutionality of the
line-item veto, besides the fact that it deprives the President of a
valuable tool for checking Congress, is that it deprives Congress
of the incentive to pass legislation that is popular with the Presi-
dent solely in order to package it with legislation disfavored by
the President, but popular with Congress. In other words, the
line-item veto not only results in an increase of legislation favored
by Congress, but in an increase in legislation favored by the Pres-
ident, but disfavored by Congress. Such legislation will be passed
to "buy" the President's vote on other legislation. Thus the ab-
sence of a line-item veto should be viewed as impermissible log-
. rolling at the presidential level. The lack of a viable line-item
veto increases the stranglehold of special-interest groups and re-
sults in fewer checks on the lawmaking process. These results are
wholly inconsistent with the theory of the separation of powers
presented here. Because a line-item veto provision would
strengthen the system of separation of powers, it should be held
constitutional if enacted by Congress.
Finally, I wish to note that the analysis of the line-item veto
presented here is in sharp contrast to the occasional Congres-
sional pronouncements that implementation of a line-item veto
procedure would somehow deprive the federal judiciary of juris-
diction to hear constitutional challenges to certain of its enact-
ments. Unlike the line-item veto, any statute purporting to de-
prive the judiciary of jurisdiction to pass upon the
constitutionality of an act of Congress would reflect an attempt to
thwart the system of checks and balances and undermine the sep-
aration of powers inherent in the constitutional scheme by elimi-
nating the important check on Congress performed by Article
Three judges. But by the same token, efforts by the judiciary to
enter the spheres of the executive or legislative branches should
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be viewed with suspicion, as should efforts by Congress to tell the
President how to veto laws.
No case has brought the subtle issues surrounding the separa-
tion of powers into sharper focus than the legislative veto case,
INS u. Chadha. A legislative veto permits one or both branches of
Congress to review and invalidate the actions of federal agencies
and executive departments. The constitutional test of the legisla-
tive veto arose because Congress had given the Immigration and
Naturalization Service limited discretion to suspend the deporta-
tions of aliens whose visas had expired. The power of the INS to
suspend such deportations was limited by Congress in that both
the Senate and the House of Representatives retained the right to
veto a decision by the INS to suspend deportation.
Chadha was a foreign graduate student who had prevailed upon
the INS to permit him to remain in the U.S. after his visa ex-
pired, only to have his stay of deportation vetoed by a House res-
olution. The Supreme Court invalidated the legislative veto on
the grounds that all action taken by Congress that is legislative in
character must be the result of a "single, finely wrought and ex-
haustively considered procedure"z4 that is consistent with the
"explicit and unambiguous provisions" of Article One.Zli
At first, the case appears to be wrongly decided when viewed
from the public choice perspective on the separation of powers
presented here, because the legislative veto appears simply to
function as an arrangement under which Congress, exercising neg-
ative authority, can invalidate the activities of overly aggressive
administrative agencies that sometimes exceed the boundaries of
their authority. But applying the public choice approach to the
separation of powers presented here, I believe Justice Burger's
opinion in Chadha was correct for two reasons.
First, once the separation of powers is properly seen as an im-
portant component of the larger system of checks and balances,
the Chadha decision is defensible on the grounds that it strength-
ens the separation of authority that exists within the procedural
rules of Congress itself. As has been detailed elsewhere, the Arti-
cle One process provides a mechanism for solving some of the
seemingly intractable problems associated with collective deci-
24. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
25. [d. at 945.
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sion-making.26 As Buchanan and Tullock have shown, the bi-
camerality requirement introduces what is, in effect, a
supermajority voting requirement into the law-making process.27
Thus, the structure of Article One itself was designed to prevent
the "facility and excess of law-making" that the Framers recog-
nized as "the diseases to which our governments are most
liable. "28
From a public choice perspective, any attempt by Congress to
act without fully conforming to the decision-making framework
described within Article One is itself a violation of a fundamental
separation of powers principle because the creation of a bicameral
legislature, whose members serve different constituencies and are
subject to a number of procedural constraints when passing laws,
is an important and effective source for diffusing legislative
power.29 In other words, the checking and balancing effectuated
by the separation of powers occurs within Congress itself just as it
occurs among the various branches. Bicamerality raises the deci-
sions costs of government, and is thus an important facet of the
system of separation of powers.
Thus the majority opinion in Chadha bolstered the integrity of
the constitutional separation of powers by extending that princi-
ple to the bicamerality requirement. In addition, the decision, by
invalidating the legislative veto, rendered unconstitutional a prac-
tice that "offered lawmakers a way to delegate vast power to the
executive branch or to independent agencies while retaining the
option to cancel particular exercises of such power-and most im-
portantly, to exercise this oversight without having to pass new
legislation or to repeal existing laws."30
The point here is that the legislative veto ought to be viewed as
a manifestation of Congress' propensity to make broad delega-
tions of legislative authority to administrative agencies. Clearly,
Congress should not be permitted to delegate to an administra-
tive agency its legislative powers. Such broad delegations should
be declared unconstitutional. If the enabling legislation under
which the INS was acting had been an impermissible delegation
26. See Mayton, The Possibilities of Collective Choice: Arrow's Theorem, Article I, and
the Delegation of Legislative Power to Administrative Agencies, 1986 DUKE L.J. 948.
27. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 232-48 (1962).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 62, at 417 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
29. See Macey, supra note 16, at 247-50.
30. L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 214.
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of legislative power (which it does not appear to have been), then
the original statute empowering the INS to suspend deportations
was invalid. But similarly, Congress can delegate to an adminis-
trative agency the authority to effect the purposes of the statutes
it enacts.31 If the initial grant of authority to the INS was a
proper legislative delegation, then it clearly is impermissible for a
small subgroup within Congress to impede the operation of a
valid statute.
In other words, the legislative veto appears to have made it eas-
ier for Congress to effectuate broad, unconstitutional delegations
of authority to administrative agencies. Declaring the legislative
veto unconstitutional makes it more costly for Congress to make
broad delegations of power, and thus the decision should be ap-
plauded. In cases like Chadha, where Congress attempts to retain
a legislative veto after making an otherwise valid delegation to an
administrative agency, the veto should be struck down as a viola-
tion of the procedures mandated by Article One.
In sum, the constitutionality of the legislative veto can only be .
understood within the context of the delegation doctrine. If the
initial delegation by Congress was constitutional, then the case
was correctly decided. If the initial delegation was overbroad,
then the statute itself should have been invalidated on those
grounds..
Thus the Court's reasoning in Chadha was consistent with the
checks and balances approach to the separation of powers
presented here. As the above discussion points out, the legislative
veto came about as a result of Congress' increasing proclivity to
make broad delegations of legislative authority to administrative
agencies. Such broad delegations are unconstitutional under the
analysis presented here because they permit laws to be passed
that have not been through the intricate Article One refinement
process. Thus not only should the legislative veto be declared un-
constitutional, but legislation that contains legislative veto provi-
sions should be scrutinized closely to determine whether it con-
tains impermissible delegations of legislative power to
administrative agencies.
While at first blush the doctrine of separation of powers ap-
pears to be an arid, even anachronistic formalism, in fact it serves
an important role within the constitutional scheme that deserves
31. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8; Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778 (1948).
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to be better understood. It is my belief that the theoretical justifi-
cation for the separation of powers is that it protects individual
liberty by raising the decision costs of government. As the costs of
governmental decision-making goes up, the grip of special-inter-
est groups on the legislative process weakens, and such groups are
induced to take more of their activities out of the legislative
sphere where the focus is on wealth transfers and into the private
market, where the focus is on wealth creation.
Merely because the separation of powers is a structural compo-
nent of the Constitution should not mean that it is not entitled to
protection by the judiciary. Indeed, the structural components of
the Constitution are its very foundation, in part because they are
less subject to legislative tinkering and to subsequent invalidation
through legislative interpretation. As such, they are entitled to
special respect. Such protection should come by respecting the
constitutionality of legislation permitting a line-item veto, and by
invalidation of the legislative veto. In addition, it seems clear that
the separation of powers would also be strengthened by increased
judicial scrutiny of broad delegations of legislative power to ad-
ministrative agencies, whose actions are not subject to the finely
wrought deliberative process envisioned by Article One.
F. QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
MR. CARVIN: This is for Professor Farina. I certainly do not
mean this literally, but your invocation of The Federalist really
does prove that the devil can quote scripture, because you took
entirely out of context the remarks that you quoted. Separation
of powers has two components, the purposes of which are to dif-
fuse powers. One is you break up governmental functions into
three different power centers. The second is to say that some
things are so important, we are not going to entrust them to any
one branch. The most obvious examples are treaties and the ap-
pointment of judges which are subject to the advise and consent
function, and as for legislation, you give the President the veto
power, and those are truly shared powers. But the Constitution
prescribes that those will be shared powers. It says that this is the
legislative role and you are going to share it in this way with the
executive.
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You extrapolate, quite falsely in my view, from comments re-
flecting that there are these shared powers, a far different notion
that where the Constitution has given to one branch exclusive au-
thority over a particular governmental function, another branch
can share it with that branch.
I would like you to explain how that follows and what constitu-
tional source you can find for that proposition other than it would
mean the decline of the administrative state, because that may
be, in my view, an argument for it, not against it.
PROFESSOR FARINA: I would start from Professor Aman's
point that separation of powers is not a doctrine which has a de-
fined content in the text of the Constitution. Now, one might re-
spond to that by saying, "Of course it does: Article One talks
about 'legislative powers' being vested in Congress; Article Two
talks about the 'executive power' being vested in the President;
and Article Three talks about the 'judicial power' being vested in
the courts." But this assumes that these constitutional terms have
some self-evident, definite, shared meaning. That is often a very
problematic assumption. For example, Mr. Cooper's broad view of
what the "executive power" means leads him to insist that the
President ought to have control over independent agencies, and
that if we really put the literalist interpretation of separation of
powers up against the administrative state, the result would not
be what I predicted, which is the theory falls, but rather a won-
derful answer to the problem of reconciling administrative agen-
cies with the Constitution: We will move them under the control
of the President because, after all, he is entrusted under Article
Two with the power to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
I respond by asking how, under a literalist interpretation that
sees the Constitution as dividing power into discrete categories,
you can justify taking an agency like the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or the Interstate
Commerce Commission-each of which has enormous amounts of
power that, under traditional labeling, would be legislative and
adjudicative-and putting that agency under the umbrella of the
President on a theory that it's his constitutional job to execute
the law. If, as the literalist interpretation must assume, "execu-
tive power" has some determinate meaning, surely that meaning
cannot be simply "doing whatever Congress in the statute says
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the agency can do-even if this happens to be what we would
otherwise call 'lawmaking' or 'adjudicating.' "
In other words, you cannot have it both ways. If one is going to
take a formalistic interpretation and say, "We can define what
these categories are: We know 'legislating' when we see it; we
know 'adjudicating' when we see it; we know 'executing' when we
see it," then you cannot take these entities that combine all three
powers and purport to solve the constitutional problem they pose
by simply sticking them under the President's wing.
So that is a specific example of why you do not find in the text
of the Constitution much help as to what separation of powers
really means. You have to ask more broadly: What did the Fram-
ers think, in a larger sense, they were doing in the constitutional
structure? Were they creating a static division of powers on the
assumption that the dividing lines would always be clear? Or did
they have a sense that life changes, society moves on, and the
important thing to do is to create a mechanism that can move
forward? It seems to me that if you look at what they said and
did against the backdrop of history, you find ample support for
the more fluid, contextually sensitive, balancing interpretation of
separation of powers I have suggested.
PROFESSOR MILLER: I wanted to ask any of the panelists
what they thought of the Supreme Court's approach to separation
of powers. If you look at the decisions in the past ten years, the
Court seems to resemble the drunken sailor veering from side to
side on the deck of a ship. One opinion will be a strict construc-
tionist-type opinion like Chadha 1 or Bowsher,2 and the next opin-
ion will be like Schors or Morrison." It is just an embarrassment
that the Supreme Court cannot decide what its methodology is, or
is there any reason for its grossly inconsistent methodology from
case to case?
PROFESSOR AMAN: There is a lot of inconsistency to be
sure, and Morrison must have come as a shocker, at least the vote
in Morrison-seven to one. On the one hand, you can argue it's a
political decision. Perhaps Chief Justice Rehnquist has decided
1. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
2. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
3. Commodities Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
4. Morrison v. Olson, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988).
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that the Rehnquist Court is not going down in history as appear-
ing as an automatic supporter of Reagan Administration posi-
tions. But, of course, that gets you nowhere analytically.
I think one of the things going on, to the extent that these dif-
ferences are driven by principle, is that there are different con-
ceptions of liberty that underlie the starting points that these
various justices are taking. Coupled with these different analyti-
cal concepts of liberty is also some historical baggage. For exam-
ple, Justice Brennan is a very stern taskmaster when it comes to
formalism, particularly when the courts are involved. Very
clearly, his judicial role in the civil rights movement was a very
important one. I believe he sees the judiciary as the thin, black
band between injustice and justice.
So, the concept of liberty that Justice Brennan brings to some
of those cases is very much grounded in a kind of individual lib-
erty that rings true with the kinds of civil rights cases that domi-
nated the Warren Court. Perhaps Justice Scalia's concept of lib-
erty is more libertarian, and more of a minimalist notion of the
federal and national government. If it is going to do anything, it
had better jump through every single hoop and do it absolutely
right. Justice Scalia not only has a different analytical concept of
liberty, but has a different historical orientation. One could go
down and look at the various individual opinions, and to some
extent, that falls out and adds a little bit of order to this chaos,
but it is not perfect.
PROFESSOR RABKIN: This is for Professor Farina. If the
problem is concentrated power, and if we are free to reinterpret
and adapt the Constitution because society changes and the times
change, do you think Congress, without a constitutional amend-
ment, could just assert that there is too much power in the hands
of the Supreme Court? Five judges can legalize abortion on de-
mand, which is something the President could never do. It is
more dramatic than anything the President ever has done. One
judge can run a Boston school district for a decade. That is more
power than the President has. You have this enormous concentra-
tion of power, and since basically the theory of the Constitution is
balance, could Congress pass a law saying that no judicial deci-
sion, at least no constitutional decision, will take effect until the
majority of Congress or the majority of one House, or, to have the
kind of balancing you are in favor of, one committee in Congress
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has agreed to it? Would you think that would be constitutional in
light of the changing and evolving of the adaptation of the
Constitution?
PROFESSOR FARINA: If you are suggesting that adopting a
contextually sensitive, balancing approach commits us to ac-
cepting any conceivable reorganization of power any branch
wishes to embark on, my answer is, "No, of course not." The bal-
ancing approach does not lead you to a predictable, predeter-
mined set of answers. Instead, it frames the separation Of powers
inquiry as a set of questions: How does the balance of power in
our government now lie; is there an inordinate ·concentration in
some area; if so, how should we remedy that. Tli~ are extraordi-
narily difficult questions, and. I am not suggesting that this ap-
proach gives you easy answers. What I am suggesting is that it is
a theory of separation of powers that can accommodate the real-
ity of a twentieth century America where the configuration of
power is enormously different than it was in the eighteenth cen-
tury. It can accommodate that reality, not simply by rubber
stamping it, but by giving us an analytic approach in which we
can think about problems of control of power. Is control going to
be easy? Will this approach give us quick, predictable answers to
hard questions? Of course not. But the consequence of any theory
that purports to offer those sorts of answers is going to be to de-
value the concept of separation of powers, because you cannot
have a legal theory that gives simplistic answers in such a com-
plex society.
MR. COOPER: I have to interrupt to say that answers like the
one we have just heard make me an originalist. It is that an-
swer-that there is no predetermined set of answers-that in the
end, makes me someone who is in favor of something called "the
rule of law"-the notion that we can predict and define with
some reasonable measure of certainty, how it is we and our
elected representatives, and those in positions of power in govern-
ment are to behave.
DEAN BENNETT: I have two questions for Jon Macey, a little
one and a medium-sized one. First, I was puzzled by your asser-
tion, which I believe you have previously made in writing, that
the decision costs of government are raised by having two houses
of Congress of different sizes. I do not understand why that is so
HeinOnline -- 41 Rutgers L. Rev. 831 1988-1989
1989] SEPARATION OF POWERS 831
as opposed to having two houses of Congress that represent dif-
ferent configurations of interests. That's the little question.
The second question is whether your analysis of the constitu-
tionality of the line-item veto, which sounded like a very func-
tional, consequentialist analysis, leads you to conclude that the
independent prosecutor law is also constitutional.
PROFESSOR MACEY: I appreciate the credit. I do mention
these arguments in my earlier writings, but I am going to make it
clear that the origination of these ideas lies with Kenneth Arrow,
who actually won the Nobel Prize in part for developing these
views, and also James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock later in
their classic book, The Calculus of Consent. 1S
Essentially it has to do with diminishing decisions costs and
increasing decisions costs. Imagine you have two legislative
houses, with fifty people in one and fifty in the other, and keep-
ing the total size of the legislature constant, you then put eighty
people in one and twenty in another. By increasing the size of one
house from fifty to eighty, the costs of making a decision in that
department go up at a more rapid rate, Arrow modeled, than they
decrease by moving from fifty to twenty in the other.
So, there are two countervailing forces-increased decisions
costs by moving from fifty to eighty and decreased decisions costs
by moving from fifty to twenty in the other. The argument is sim-
ply that because of problems of transactions costs, log rolling, et
cetera, the decisions costs go up more rapidly than they go down,
so the total of decision-making is increased.
I really do not have an answer to your second question on the
independent prosecutor because my own values in this area are
very much in formation. Tying in the separation of powers and
the system of checks and balance to the line-item and legislative
veto was as much as I could muster for today.
MR. COOPER: If I could just add a point along the lines of
your second question. So "doctrinaire" is my "textualism," that
after studying the question, I have concluded publicly that there
is no constitutional basis in the text or in the history of the Con-
stitution for the line-item veto. It got me in quite a bit of trouble
with some of my good friends, including inspiring public denunci-
5. J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962).
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ations of me as timid in my role as protector of the President's
prerogative. But such are the wages of formalism and the rule of
law.
MR. CROVITZ: Your position is that the Constitution does
not, as written, provide for a line-item veto. I am not sure you
determined that a line-item veto, if passed in statute form, would
be unconstitutional.
MR. COOPER: No. I have not looked at that.
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: My question is for Professor
Aman, and that is that you repeatedly converted "deregulation"
into a "global world." I find this very puzzling. I know many peo-
ple who are in favor of moving the United States towards a more
capitalist society. None of the ones I know would change their
views if the rest of the world sunk under the waves.
I know that there are some bad arguments for deregulation
based on international competitiveness, but those all depend on
economic ideas that have been obsolete for about 160 years: pre-
Ricardian trade theories. Furthermore, identifying deregulation
with global economy is a curiously parochial notion because the
movement towards laissez-faire exists not only in the United
States, but in Great Britain, which has been part of a global econ-
omy for two centuries, during which it went from mercantilism to
laissez-faire to socialism and back to laissez-faire. It is a phe-
nomenon in New Zealand which, given its size, has always been a
part of a global economy, but has started swinging towards lais-
sez-faire only in the last couple of years. It is a phenomenon in
China.
It seems to 'me that globalism has nothing to do with it. What
has happened is that people around the world have concluded
that socialism does not work very well. The result has been a gen-
eral tendency towards less socialism. This has happened to occur
at a time when world trade is increasing some, but they are unre-
lated phenomona. I am curious as to how you would relate them.
PROFESSOR AMAN: One day you wake up in the morning
and people around the world decide that something is amiss, and
they all begin to change their minds.
PROFESSOR FRIEDMAN: It took a few years. It took a dec-
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PROFESSOR AMAN: Yes. My major point is that what drives
these kinds of changes and what creates the kind of ferment that
makes certain kinds of legal arguments lively and interesting
again are various socio-economic forces, and the philosophical
changes of perspective that accompany them..All of these are
forces that lay outside the Constitution. You may decide on
strictly philosophical grounds that deregulation is right because
the national government interferes with your liberty. I may de-
cide deregulation is right because it is costly and raises consumer
prices. I may decide for purely New Deal reasons that deregula-
tion is a pragmatic policy.
My point is that all of these forces that are pushing the law,
that are driving these kinds of issues, lie outside the law and I am
saying we should be cautious here. Let us change things. If social-
ism is dead, if we need a new way, let us change things. But this
idea of a rule of law being tied into a rigid constitutional doctrine,
one which is going to take that political discourse out of politics
and put it in a courtroom is what is troubling me.
So, I can accept your point that there are many reasons that
account for a movement towards deregulation, although I would
say that included among these is the increasingly competitive na-
ture of the world economy, the increase in trade, and the fact that
there is now so much more trade and competition world-wide that
national regulatory regimes can no longer reliably deliver benefits
to any particular constituency. This makes it politically difficult
to sustain that kind of regulatory regime. The global economy has
done much to undermine national regulation. But for whatever
reason that deregulation is occurring, my main point is the law
does not bring about change, law channels it. I have great diffi-
culty with the narrowness of the constitutional doctrine set forth
by Mr. Cooper, and trying to reify it in terms of legislative, judi-
cial or ex~cutive, is a little bit like asking whether complicated
governmental issues are to be characterized as "animal, vegetable
or mineral." I do not want to trivialize it, but that is where I am
coming from.
MR. COOPER: I take it your answer to Professor Rabkin's
question is in truth "yes" because obviously you would not be
willing to see that very political issue taken out of the political
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realm and into the courts.
PROFESSOR AMAN: There is a kind of judicial activism that
I think is spawned by this kind of formalism which troubles me,
yes, indeed.
MR. CROVITZ: We will end this with my rhetorical question of
what would the world look like if the Court had decided Lochner6
that morning and had decided a move toward regulation was not
within the purview of the courts?
6. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
